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Petro-alignment, a quid pro quo arrangement whereby great
powers offer security in exchange for oil states’ friendly oil
policies, is a widely used and yet undertheorized energy
security strategy. One consequential aspect of this exchange is
that great powers choose different levels of security commit-
ment to keep oil producers friendly. With what criteria do
great powers rank oil states? How do we conceptualize differ-
ent types of petro-alignments? What exactly do great powers
and oil producers exchange under each petro-alignment type?
I posit that a mix of market power and geostrategic location
determines the strategic value and vulnerability of individual
client oil states, which then generates four corresponding
types of petro-alignment—security guarantee, strategic align-
ment, strategic favor, and neglect. Two carefully selected case
comparisons—Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1970–91, and
Azerbaijan and Ecuador in 1990–2013—show how great
powers created, utilized, and maintained petro-alignments
under the unique logic of oil markets and across varying geo-
political settings. The findings have important implications on
great powers’ grand strategies, strategic behaviors of oil
states, and the role of oil in international security.
Petro-alignment, a quid pro quo arrangement whereby great powers offer
security support in exchange for oil states’ friendly oil policies, has been a
widely used and deeply consequential energy security strategy. Back in
1940, Nazi Germany concluded a weapons-for-oil pact with Romania,
which fueled their early campaigns of World War II.1 Throughout the Cold
War, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union competitively made
varying levels of security commitments to oil states, most demonstrably in
the Persian Gulf, in a bid for friendly access to their vast pool of oil.2
Recently, China joined the tradition of “supplier relations management”
 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
Inwook Kim is an assistant professor of political science at Singapore Management University.
1Joel Hayward, “Hitler’s Quest for Oil: The Impact of Economic Considerations on Military Strategy, 1941–42,”
Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 4 (December 1995): 99, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399508437621.
2Stephen J. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy since World War I: For Profits and Security, 2nd ed.
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005); Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and
Power (New York: Free Press, 2009); Peter Mangold, Superpower Intervention in the Middle East (London: Croom
Helm, 1978); Avi Shlaim, War and Peace in the Middle East: A Concise History (New York: Penguin, 1995).
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with oil producers in Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, generating
heated debates about its political, market, and security implications.3
Beyond recognizing the shared “oil-for-security” principle, however, the
literature is yet to grasp the striking variation found in the form and level
of petro-alignments. Study of the history and practice of US commitment
to the Persian Gulf, for instance, is predominantly directed to the region as
a whole and rarely disaggregated into individual oil producers. Bilateral
petro-alignment relations, however, exhibit significant and subtle variations:
only to Saudi Arabia was Washington willing to openly proclaim its deter-
mination “not to allow Saudi Arabia to fall into the hands of any external
and internal forces.”4 In contrast, Kuwait, another significant and dovish
producer, was explicitly denied any hint of security guarantee throughout
the Cold War.5 Variation outside the Persian Gulf is equally striking. Oil
allegedly was what attracted varying levels of security support to producers
such as Angola, Kazakhstan, or Nigeria from interested great powers, while
barely any additional security was available to others like Brunei, Ecuador,
or Equatorial Guinea. Clearly, oil states are not born equal. Great powers
accordingly rank them based on the strategic worth of individual producers
and allocate their military risks and resources correspondingly, generating
the petro-alignment variation.
What makes Saudi Arabia distinct from other producers? With what cri-
teria do great powers rank oil states? How do we categorize different types
of petro-alignments? Under each type of petro-alignment, how do oil pro-
ducers serve great powers’ interests, and what kind of security patronage
do great powers offer in return?
The study of petro-alignment variation matters because, first and fore-
most, the dynamics of petro-alignment are a key international security vari-
able affecting regional security dynamics, great power politics, and global
oil market stability. Yet, by lumping all levels of petro-alignment relations
into a single “oil-for-security” concept, the literature has generally failed to
comprehend the precise sets of strategic opportunities and limits oil states
face, how great powers allocate military resources and risks to secure access
to foreign oil, and how different types of petro-alignments function
in practice.
3Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press, “Markets or Mercantilism? How China Secures Its Energy Supplies,”
International Security 42, no. 4 (Spring 2018): 179–81, 187–94, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00310; Elizabeth
C. Economy and Michael Levi, By All Means Necessary: How China’s Resource Quest Is Changing the World
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
4President Ronald Reagan quoted in Steven R. Weisman, “Reagan Says U.S. Would Bar a Takeover in Saudi
Arabia That Imperiled Flow of Oil,” New York Times, 2 October 1981, https://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/02/
world/reagan-says-us-would-bar-a-takeover-in-saudi-arabia-that-imperiled-flow-of-oil.html.
5Shlaim, War and Peace in the Middle East, 93–94; Chookiat Panaspornprasit, US–Kuwaiti Relations, 1961–1992:
An Uneasy Relationship (London: Routledge, 2005).
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Giving analytical primacy to petro-alignment and its variation also
uncovers previously underexplored properties of oil in international secur-
ity: oil as a security asset that helps oil states reduce security burdens and
as a security cooperation facilitator. In making this case, I advance the lat-
est challenge against the popular portrayal of oil as a security liability that
victimizes oil states and that triggers interstate conflicts and wars.6
Furthermore, the variation within petro-alignment—oil sometimes forges a
full-fledged security patronage, but other oil productions are entirely com-
mercial and draw little strategic interests from great powers—emphasizes
that oil’s security consequences are not absolute but embedded in the
unique logic of the oil market and surrounding strategic conditions.
Overall, petro-alignment and its variation imply that oil’s security conse-
quences are more conditional, complex, and diverse than often assumed.
To analyze the petro-alignment variation, I first conceptualize that petro-
alignment emerges and functions as an asymmetric alliance in which a
great power and an oil state exchange security and oil to realize their inter-
ests in oil security and additional security support, respectively. The level
and substance of this exchange is not equal across petro-alignment.
Instead, it corresponds to varying levels of oil states’ ability to promise and
deliver oil benefits.
The argument of this paper is that petro-alignment variation is largely
accounted for by an interplay between oil states’ market power and geostra-
tegic location. Market power refers to producers’ ability to stabilize or dis-
rupt the oil price. New categories are proposed, which divide producers
into “price-stabilizer,” “price-upsetter,” and “price-follower,” according to a
presence of spare production capacity and by the nature in which oil pro-
ducers influence oil price. Geostrategic locations, on the other hand, are
concerned with the client oil states’ strategic vulnerability to rival powers’
control and influence, coded by the presence or absence of rival great
powers’ military power projection capability. Overall, a mix of the two
determines the strategic needs for great powers to form petro-alignment
with individual oil states, resulting in offering one of four ideal types of
petro-alignment: security guarantee, strategic alignment, strategic favor,
and neglect.
I examine this theory with two carefully chosen comparative case studies.
An in-depth study of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1971–91 reveals that
6For general overview about oil and war, see Jeff D. Colgan, “Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War,”
International Security 38, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 147–80, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00135; Charles L. Glaser,
“How Oil Influences U.S. National Security,” International Security 38, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 112–46, https://doi.org/
10.1162/ISEC_a_00137. For critical review about oil wars, see Emily Meierding, “Dismantling the Oil Wars
Myth,” Security Studies 25, no. 2 (April–June 2016): 258–88, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1171968. For
oil’s pathway to peace, see Ziv Rubinovitz and Elai Rettig, “Crude Peace: The Role of Oil Trade in the
Israeli–Egyptian Peace Negotiations,” International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 2 (June 2018): 371–82, https://doi.
org/10.1093/isq/sqx073.
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Saudi Arabia’s replacement of the United States as a sole price-stabilizer in
the early 1970s, in the context of deepening rivalry with the Soviet Union,
was pivotal in Washington’s decision to scale up, institutionalize, and
enhance the credibility of its de facto security guarantee to Riyadh. In con-
trast, despite being a critical price-upsetter located in a geostrategic loca-
tion, Kuwait’s petro-alignment relations took the shape of strategic
alignment with the United States, reflecting its more limited market power.
A short plausibility probe on Azerbaijan and Ecuador in 1991–2015 fol-
lows, illustrating how different geostrategic location settings led the two oil
states of similar market power to very different petro-alignment opportuni-
ties: strategic favor and neglect, respectively.
The first section explains the organizing principles of petro-alignment
and how they serve great powers’ oil interests. Next, I explain the market
power and geostrategic location variables and construct the four ideal types
of petro-alignments based on the coding of three criteria: material support,
institutionalization, and commitment. I then lay out the theory to explain
the petro-alignment variation. Next, I present the two comparative case
studies. Lastly, I discuss how the paper contributes to larger theoretical
debates within the security studies literature.
Conceptualizing Petro-Alignment and Its Variation
Historically, oil has been integral to great powers’ national security calculus
because it fuels virtually all modern transportation. Oil’s monopoly still
persists today; it accounts for 92 percent of US civilian transportation fuel;
oil is also a key source for US military operational energy, or “energy
required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons
for military operations.”7 Furthermore, for the same reasons, uninterrupted
and friendly access to oil has been one of key “public goods” that great
powers are expected to deliver to their allies.8 Overall, the monopolization
of fuel sources made oil indispensable in macroeconomic stability, military
power, great powers’ grand strategies, and consequently, according to
Kenneth N. Waltz, “the only economic interest for which the United States
may have to fight.”9
7Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment, Department of Defense
2016 Operational Energy Strategy (December 2015), 4, https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/2016%
20DoD%20Operational%20Energy%20Strategy%20WEBc.pdf; Stacy Closson, “The Military and Energy: Moving
the United States beyond Oil,” Energy Policy 61 (October 2013): 306–16, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.
102; Energy Information Administration (EIA), “U.S. Primary Energy Consumption by Source and Sector, 2017,”
(2018), https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/archive/flowimages/2017/css_2017_energy.pdf.
8Joshua Rovner and Caitlin Talmadge, “Hegemony, Force Posture, and the Provision of Public Goods: The Once
and Future Role of Outside Powers in Securing Persian Gulf Oil,” Security Studies 23, no. 3 (July–September
2014): 548–81, https://doi.org/10.1080/15325024.2014.935224.
9Kenneth N. Waltz, “A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force,” International Security 5, no. 4 (1981): 52,
https://doi.org/10.2307/2538713.
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In their search for stable and secure access to oil, great powers have long
created, maintained, and utilized different types of petro-alignments with
oil producers. At its core, petro-alignment emerges and functions as an
“asymmetric alliance” in which great powers and oil producers exchange
favors between oil and security.10 The term usefully captures large power
differentials usually found between great powers and oil states acting as
patron and client states, respectively, whereby two separate goals define the
incentives to form and join a petro-alignment: for great power patrons,
they pursue a stable and secure access to oil; for client oil states, they seek
additional external security support. Each possesses assets that meet the
other’s needs; a zone of mutual benefits thus emerges in which the two
engage in “a reciprocal exchange of goods and services between the patron
and client governments that serves to enhance the security of the two
countries and cannot easily be obtained by them from other sources.”11
The forms and levels of petro-alignment vary markedly. Above all, oil
states are not created equally. Large disparities among oil states exist in
location, quality of crude oil, production volume, strategic context of oil
flows, and in other geological conditions or political contexts. For great
powers, provision of security assistance and guarantee through petro-align-
ments are also costly and risky business, compelling them to rank oil states
according to the needs for petro-alignment. In short, some producers will
merit security patronage more than others, and great powers must priori-
tize their limited military resources toward more valuable and vulner-
able clients.
Unfortunately, the variation is not adequately recognized in the litera-
ture. Mainstream realism typically treats alliances as tools of power aggre-
gation against common adversaries or threats.12 Since alliance formation is
motivated by exogenous factors under the power-aggregation model, it
struggles to explain why the United States differentiated its security com-
mitment between friendly oil states in the Persian Gulf that were perceived
to be under Soviet threats during the Cold War. Petro-alignment, in con-
trast, emphasizes intra-alliance exchange of favors to satisfy their separate
goals, not to add fighting capabilities against a common enemy.
Furthermore, the literature also needs to go beyond the vague and
undersubstantiated notion that oil is vital and thus warrants national secur-
ity concern. Scholarship generally remains uninformed about complexity
10For foundational works on asymmetric alliance, see Michael F. Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and
Test,” Western Political Quarterly 37, no. 4 (December 1984): 523–44; James D. Morrow, “Alliances and
Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political
Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 904–33, https://doi.org/10.2307/2111499.
11Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991), 2.
12Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Stephen M. Walt, The
Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
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surrounding the actors in, and the structure and logic of, the oil market
itself, which leads to a relative dearth of relevant historical analysis and pol-
icy debates about great powers’ response to energy anxiety.13 In filling this
gap, Rosemary A. Kelanic recently argued that great powers adopt so-called
“anticipatory measures” to reduce coercive vulnerability imposed by oil
dependency and that varying degrees of “petroleum-deficit” determines a
choice of anticipatory measure. Petro-alignment, termed as “indirect con-
trol,” is one such measure, designed to “keep oil in friendly hands and
away from adversaries.”14 While outlining petro-alignment’s general princi-
ples and characteristics, Kelanic still leaves an important gap, most notably
why great powers choose different levels of security commitment to keep
oil producers friendly. It calls for explanation of exactly how petro-align-
ment addresses great powers’ energy concerns, how petro-alignment varies
across oil states, and with what types of military commitment great powers
seek to create and maintain each petro-alignment relation.
Benefits of Petro-Alignment
Market Stability
By almost singlehandedly powering modern mobility without viable substi-
tutes, even a small-sized oil-supply disruption could cause disproportion-
ately large distress in a state’s macroeconomic performance—oil price
increases dampen industrial production by raising input cost, suppressing
demand by shrinking disposable income, sharpening adjustment or alloca-
tion costs, and discouraging investment.15 Indeed, sudden increases in oil
price have often preceded economic recessions in the post–World War
II world.16
Great powers have sought to bolster market stabilizing force through
petro-alignment. First, great powers reduce the chances of supply shocks by
13For exceptions, see Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, “Protecting ‘The Prize’: Oil and the U.S. National Interest,”
Security Studies 19, no. 3 (July–September 2010): 453–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2010.505865;
Llewelyn Hughes and Austin Long, “Is There an Oil Weapon? Security Implications of Changes in the Structure
of the International Oil Market,” International Security 39, no. 3 (Winter 2014/15): 152–89, https://doi.org/10.
1162/ISEC_a_00188; Charles L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic, eds., Crude Strategy: Rethinking the US Military
Commitment to Defend Persian Gulf Oil (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016).
14Rosemary A. Kelanic, “The Petroleum Paradox: Oil, Coercive Vulnerability, and Great Power Behavior,” Security
Studies 25, no. 2 (April–June 2016): 190, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1171966.
15For a review of relevant literature, see Kenneth Vincent, “The Economic Costs of Persian Gulf Oil Supply
Disruptions,” in Crude Strategy ed. Glaser and Kelanic, 93–95.
16James D. Hamilton, “Oil and the Macroeconomy since World War II,” Journal of Political Economy 91, no. 2
(April 1983): 228–48; Olivier J. Blanchard and Jordi Gali, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Shocks: Why Are
the 2000s So Different from the 1970s?” (working paper 13368, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Cambridge, MA, September 2007), https://doi.org/10.3386/w13368; James D. Hamilton, “Causes and
Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007–08,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (Spring 2009): 215–65.
For debate, see Lutz Kilian, “Not All Oil Price Shocks Are Alike: Disentangling Demand and Supply Shocks in
the Crude Oil Market,” American Economic Review 99, no. 3 (June 2009): 1053–69, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.
99.3.1053.
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buttressing client oil states’ internal and external security against coups, civil
wars, and geopolitical conflicts. Oil states’ security is a concern in the oil
market particularly when such states are in conflict-ridden regions. Great
powers’ support can take a variety of forms, including arms sales and trans-
fers, training, joint exercises, military basing, or even a security guarantee.
Because client states’ enhanced defense and deterrence capability reduces the
chance of politically oriented supply shocks, petro-alignment creates a thicker
cushion against market panic and bolsters market confidence in general.
Second, great powers leverage their security ties to influence clients’ oil
pricing and production policy in their favor. In 1979, for instance, follow-
ing a meeting with President Jimmy Carter, Iran’s Shah decided to “give
Western nations a break” by moderating his previously hawkish pricing
policy “in exchange for the continued flow of arms from the United
States.”17 Washington also had repeatedly requested dovish client producers
such as Saudi Arabia to exert price-moderation influence. Although the
Saudis’ rationale was generally to keep the market stable, its dovish inter-
vention was far from assured when nonmarket factors such as domestic
budgetary needs, political climate, or rise of regional tensions over
Arab–Israel conflicts or Iran incentivized hawkish pricing.18 Another price-
stabilizing mechanism is the use of excess capacity in times of supply dis-
ruption. By being able to swiftly make up the lost barrels, petro-alignment
with swing producers serves to stabilize oil price movement and restore
market confidence.19 Overall, petro-alignment has historically served as a
reliable and effective, if not perfect, strategy to prevent unanticipated sup-
ply shocks and reduce their impact on the market.
Military Advantage
As a critical source for military fuel requirements, petro-alignment func-
tions as a vital asset in great powers’ military preparations, plans, and oper-
ations. In wartime, ensuring supply of friendly foreign oil proved critical to
executing and winning mechanized warfare, as few states can maintain full
self-sufficiency in meeting demanding wartime fuel requirements. During
World War II, for instance, the Soviet Union and Britain relied on the
United States, which supplied six out of seven billion barrels consumed by
the Allies.20 Once the United States became a net oil importer in the 1950s,
the Persian Gulf helped fuel America’s wars, including the Vietnam War
17Yergin, The Prize, 628.
18Steve A. Yetiv, Crude Awakenings: Global Oil Security and American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2010), 153–57.
19International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Saudi Arabia: Selected Issues” IMF Country Report 13/230 (IMF:
Washington, DC, July 2013), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13230.pdf; Robert McNally, Crude
Volatility: The History and the Future of Boom-Bust Oil Prices (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).
20McNally, Crude Volatility, 92–93.
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and the First Gulf War. Great powers’ allies are additional beneficiaries of
client producers’ oil. During the Cold War, the mobility of US allies, most
notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Japan, report-
edly critically hinged on friendly foreign oil supply from the Persian Gulf.21
Conversely, if petro-alignment is either lacking or troubled, the resulting
oil shortage could entail dire military implications. In peacetime, an oil
shortage could cause great powers to struggle to train troops and maintain
military readiness. In the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, for instance, the
United States had to curtail its operational and training activities, causing
“significant degradation of combat readiness.”22 In wartime, an oil shortage
severely jeopardizes the military’s ability to deploy and concentrate forces,
and diversify means of military attack and defense. As a result, a large-scale
oil supply disruption could cost as much as “the loss of an important mili-
tary campaign, or indeed a war,” then–Defense Secretary Harold Brown
once remarked.23 Of course, as a foreign source of oil, credibility and
security of petro-alignment cannot be entirely assured. However, petro-
alignment gives a friendlier and securer access to vast pool of foreign oil
than otherwise, and accordingly it has been a crucial source in meeting the
great powers’ and their allies’ military operational energy requirement.
Second, petro-alignment denies rival powers’ access to client states’ oil in
times of military contingencies. As witnessed during World War II, compe-
tition for oil becomes an intense zero-sum game during wartime. Great
power patrons achieve denial by extending the defense capability of the cli-
ent oil producers and securing the preferential supply of oil for themselves
and not their rival powers. The rival powers are then compelled to concen-
trate more military resources than otherwise required, should it become
necessary to take over the oil producers. If oil fields are deemed indefens-
ible, petro-alignments also allow a denial-by-destruction strategy, which
retreating Dutch technicians employed by destroying the Balikpapan oil
fields in 1941 in the wake of Japanese invasion.24 During the Cold War,
the United States and Britain maintained covert plans to sabotage oil fields
in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, possibly using nuclear weapons, as part of
a denial strategy against the Soviet invasion.25 These plans required pre-
positioning of necessary explosives, training of people on the ground, and
21Harold Brown, “Secretary of Defense Annual Report” (Department of Defense, 29 January 1981), 26, https://
history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1981_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150845-130.
22National Security Decision Directive 87, “Comprehensive U.S. Energy Security Policy,” Reagan Presidential
Library, 30 March 1983, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/
nsdd87.pdf.
23Brown, “Secretary of Defense Annual Report,” 26.
24Yergin, The Prize, 333–36.
25I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this case. See Steve Everly, “U.S., Britain Developed Plans to
Disable or Destroy Middle East Oli Facilities from Late 1940s to Early 1960s in Event of a Soviet Invasion,”
National Security Archive Briefing Book 552, George Washington University, (23 June 2016), https://nsarchive.
gwu.edu/briefing-book/iran-nuclear-vault/2016-06-23/us-britain-developed-plans-disable-or-destroy-middle.
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easy access to the oil fields, all of which were politically sensitive but ultim-
ately attainable due to the petro-alignment arrangements.
Commercial Benefits
Though not as central as market stability or military power, petro-alignment
brings benefits that are not easily available otherwise. One is influencing des-
tinations of petro-dollars. Oil states accrue a large sum of oil revenue, and
therefore how they spend those dollars on imports, investment, or procure-
ment often raises large enough financial and business interests for great
powers to warrant state-level involvement.26 The other benefit concerns
where to award the lucrative exploration and production (E&P) contracts,
which are often not made transparently but behind the closed doors.27
Unsurprisingly, oil states tend to favor their patrons as a gesture of goodwill
to further entrap their strategic commitments. For instance, Saudi Arabia
awarded US companies billion-dollar contracts in the early 2000s, including
one on Al-Ghawar field to ExxonMobil in 2001.28 The decision went against
opposition from the domestic business community and ARAMCO, who
were sufficiently capable of developing and commercializing the new fields
themselves. Ali Al Naimi, then-CEO of Saudi ARAMCO and an influential
ex-minister of petroleum and mineral resources, recalled that the decision
represented a strategic objective of top leadership to “revitalize the
relationship” with Washington, not economic rationale.29
Petro-Alignments as Myth?
How useful is petro-alignment in advancing oil security? Recently, critics
contended that state military intervention is an unnecessary and costly
energy strategy. More specifically, the oil market is globally integrated, effi-
cient, and well prepared such that great powers’ mercantilist and military
approach adds little stability while risking political backlash and consuming
military resources.30 In this vein, petro-alignment is a myth and not a prac-
tical solution to energy anxiety.
26Steve Chan, “The Consequences of Expensive Oil on Arms Transfers,” Journal of Peace Research 17, no. 3
(September 1980): 235–46; Mahmoud A. El-Gamal and Amy Myers Jaffe, Oil, Dollars, Debt, and Crises: The
Global Curse of Black Gold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
27Oksan Bayulgen, Foreign Investment and Political Regimes: The Oil Sector in Azerbaijan, Russia, and Norway
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
28Bloomberg News, “Saudis Pick Exxon Mobil and Shell for Huge Gas Projects,” New York Times, 3 June 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/03/world/saudis-pick-exxon-mobil-and-shell-for-huge-gas-projects.html.
29Ali Al-Naimi, Out of the Desert: My Journey from Nomadic Bedoin to the Heart of Global Oil (London: Portfolio
Penguin, 2016). 224–32.
30Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, “Energy Alarmism: The Myths That Make Americans Worry about Oil,” Policy
Analysis 589 (Cato Institute, 5 April 2007), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/energy-alarmism-
myths-make-americans-worry-about-oil.
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While rightly warning against excessive alarmism, petro-alignment as
myth is far from uncontroversial. Other scholars counter that the oil market
carries nonnegligible uncertainty and risk. Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press,
for instance, maintain that states worry about the “four C’s”—imperfect con-
tracting, collusion, geographical concentration, and conflict—which create
needs for energy mercantilism.31 Perception matters, too. The oil market is a
politicized enterprise partly because “policymakers believe it is.”32 Such a
perception, justified or not, has been self-fulfilling, persistent, and therefore
consequential.33 Although there may be competing arguments regarding
whether great powers should care about oil access, there is little evidence
that they do not. Paradoxically, advocates for laissez-faire and strategic
restraint demonstrate that great powers have never fully decoupled the ques-
tion about access to foreign oil from national security policy.
Variation in Petro-Alignments
In the search for an optimal level of petro-alignment, I posit that an inter-
play of two critical factors—market power and geostrategic location—deter-
mine individual producers’ value and vulnerability; great powers then
choose the corresponding levels of security commitment to their present
and potential client producers, which consequently generates the petro-
alignment variation (Figure 1). This section defines market power and geo-
strategic location and proposes categories for the two variables.
Market Power
Market power refers to “the ability of a single economic actor (or small
group of actors) to have a substantial influence on market prices.”34 In the
Figure 1. From oil to petro-alignment relations.
31Lind and Press, “Markets or Mercantilism?”
32Blake Clayton and Michael Levi, “The Surprising Sources of Oil’s Influence,” Survival 54, no. 6 (December 2012):
113, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2012.749637.
33Many have noted mismatches between reality and perception about different aspects of global oil market.
Roger J. Stern, “Oil Scarcity Ideology in US Foreign Policy, 1908–97,” Security Studies 25, no. 2 (April–June
2016): 214–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1171967; Jeff D. Colgan, “The Emperor Has No Clothes:
The Limits of OPEC in the Global Oil Market,” International Organization 68, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 599–632,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000489; Blake C. Clayton, Market Madness: A Century of Oil Panics, Crises,
and Crashes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
34N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Fort Worth, TX: Dryden Press, 1998), 779. Relatedly, there is a
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that measures market concentration. See Hughes and Long, “Is There an Oil
Weapon?” While useful in measuring the overall trend of market power concentration, the HHI does not show
the individual producers’ market share.
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oil market, two factors are salient for determining a producer’s market
power—production volume and spare production capacity. According to
the nature of how the individual oil producer can influence the market
price or an inability to do so, I categorize the oil producers’ market power
into the following three groups—”price-stabilizer,” “price-upsetter,” and
“price-follower.”
Price-Stabilizer
Price-stabilizers, often known as swing producers, keep some oil fields off-
line and maintain the so-called spare production capacity that “can be
brought to the market within thirty days and sustained for least for ninety
days.”35 Because foregoing some production capacity requires both incen-
tives to influence the commodity price and willingness to bear the oppor-
tunity and maintenance costs, usually only the largest producers(s) in a
highly skewed market adopt such a practice. With high geological concen-
trations of oil deposits, the global oil market is conducive to an excess of
capacity developing.36 Only a few states have the capability and incentives
to attain and operate excess capacity, and historically there were only two
such unique producers—the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC) from the
1930s to the late 1960s and Saudi Arabia since the 1970s.37
Price-stabilizers have historically acted as a buffer against price volatility
via two mechanisms. One is by making up lost barrels in times of supply
disruption. For instance, the TRC pumped out almost 1 million barrels per
day (mb/d) of additional oil during the 1967 Six Day War, helping to com-
pensate for the Arab’s selective embargo, a function it also performed in
the 1956 Suez crisis.38 The excess capacity of TRC eventually vanished in
1972, when it could no longer cope with soaring domestic demand. Riyadh
shortly emerged as a replacement swing producer throughout the 1970s
Table 1. Market power. Price-effecting mechanism and production capacity.
Price-Effecting Mechanism Production Capacity
Price-Stabilizer 1. Release of spare
production capacity
2. All mechanisms listed in
price-upsetters cell
A large oil producer with sizeable
spare production capacity
Price-Upsetter 1. Conflict among price-upsetters
2. Two or more crises
simultaneously happening
3. Collapse of entire production
2.5% or more of global
total production
Price-Followers None Less than 2.5% of global production
35EIA, “Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained,” 30 March 2018, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/
print.php?page=oil_prices.
36Examples of other swing producers include de Beers in the diamond industry or China in rare earths.
37For more detailed history of the TRC, see McNally, Crude Volatility, 67–112.
38McNally, 96–100; Yergin, The Prize, 539.
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and has similarly intervened in the market, including during the 1979–80
oil shock, the First Gulf War (1990–91), and the recent 2011 Libyan cri-
sis.39 The swift compensation of lost barrels has significant restoring power.
The International Monetary Fund projected that, against a permanent two
percent oil supply shock, Riyadh’s “full replacement” can bring down the
price to a pre-crisis level within three quarters, as opposed to a 40 percent
or more price increase under a no-intervention scenario.40
The other mechanism is more structural. The existence of spare produc-
tion capacity itself can have a price-stabilizing effect, as it creates market
confidence, lowers business risks, reduces incentives for hedging, and there-
fore helps to dampen market volatility. By converse logic, a lack of spare
production alarms the market by signaling its reduced ability to withstand
geopolitical risks.41 Indeed, the rapid decline of spare production capacity
has arguably contributed to the run-up in oil prices from 2003 to 2008.42
Spare production capacity, however, is not a panacea for oil price fragil-
ity.43 Its release is usually a short-term countermeasure, effective only
against temporary and limited supply disruptions, and not against long-
term demand-driven increases in oil price. For instance, it was unable to
prevent the sustained price upsurge throughout the 2000s caused by rising
demand in China and India and stagnant global production.44 However,
given the market’s exposure to exogenous supply shocks from geopolitical
events, which are not infrequent, a presence of spare capacity has arguably
“proven to be the most important single asset for the world’s supply
security,”45 creating a unique market status and power for price-stabilizers.
Price-Upsetter
Price-upsetters are those who produce more than 2.5 percent of global sup-
ply. They can upset the market because a shock that suddenly takes that
much oil off the market for a sustained period has historically imposed
heavy cost on great powers.46 For instance, a supply loss of 2.9 percent
39Gholz and Press, “Protecting ‘The Prize’”; IMF, “Saudi Arabia.”
40IMF, “Saudi Arabia,” 12.
41Michael Cohen, “STEO Supplement: Why Are Oil Prices So High?” Short Term Energy Outlook (EIA, 2010).
42EIA, “Energy & Financial Markets: What Drives Crude Oil Prices?” 2015, https://www.eia.gov/finance/markets/
crudeoil/supply-opec.php.
43For a debate on the power of excess capacity, see Michael Levi, “The Enduring Vulnerabilities of Oil Markets,”
Security Studies 22, no. 1 (January–March 2013): 132–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.757171.
Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, “Enduring Resilience: How Oil Markets Handle Disruptions,” Security Studies
22, no. 1 (January–March 2013): 139–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.757167.
44Kilian, “Not All Oil Price Shocks Are Alike.”
45Enno Harks, “The International Energy Forum and the Mitigation of Oil Market Risks,” in Global Energy
Governance: The New Rules of the Game, ed. Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin Vitte (Berlin: Global Public
Policy Institute, 2010), 253.
46This threshold is calculated from Phillip C. Beccue and Hillard G. Huntington, “An Assessment of Oil Market
Disruption Risks,” Final Report EMF SR 8 (Energy Modeling Forum, Stanford University, 3 October 2005), which
defines 2mb/d loss, approximately 2.5 percent of global supply at the time of their writing. Similarly, IMF,
“Saudi Arabia” denotes 2 percent loss of daily global supply as supply disruption.
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with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 caused the oil price to skyrocket by
71.6 percent, significantly dampening global gross domestic product
growth.47 Admittedly, the price shock in 1990 was unusually severe, and in
other crises oil prices were restored relatively quickly.48 However, the
impact can become severe when other market conditions, such as the grow-
ing demand for oil or a low level of excess capacity, sharpen the impact of
supply loss.49 And, together with the unsettling records of causing market
panic in the past, the stability of price-upsetters remains closely watched in
both market and energy security policy.
The history of oil shocks reveals that market upsets frequently involve
price-upsetters. Upsets occur via three routes. Above all, a disruption of a
price-upsetter’s entire production alone can cause market distress, as wit-
nessed during the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the fire at a Kuwaiti oil field
in 1991, and to a lesser extent the Libyan crises in 1970 and 2011. More
powerful market upsets occur when two or more price-upsetters engage in
wars with one another, such as the Iran–Iraq War in 1980–88 or Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. During the latter, for instance, much of the
Iraq and Kuwait oil fields stopped producing, which represented 4.43 per-
cent and 2.2 percent of global oil production, respectively.50 Lastly, market
upsets occur through unrelated but simultaneously or consecutively occur-
ring crises that involve price-upsetters. The supply crisis in 2003, for
instance, was a succession of events starting with Venezuela’s oil strike in
December 2002, and unrest in Nigeria and the Iraq War in March 2003.
The continuous and combined loss of supply contributed to the 25.8 per-
cent price rise from $24.34/barrel (all dollar amounts in USD) in
November 2002 to $30.61/barrel in March 2003.51
Price-Follower
The remaining oil-producers are price-followers. Producing below 2.5 per-
cent of global production volume, their ability to affect global oil price is
minimal, either as a member of a cartel or on its own. Historically, supply
disruptions originating from price-followers rarely cause price swings.52 In
fact, most oil exporters—32 out of 49 producers—fall into this category,
having never produced more than 2.5 percent of global oil production in
any given year since 1970.53
47Hamilton, “Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007–08.” 223, 245.
48Gholz and Press, “Protecting ‘The Prize,’” 463–72.
49Levi, “The Enduring Vulnerabilities of Oil Markets,” 133–35.
50Author’s calculation based on British Petroleum Company (BP), “BP Statistical Review of World Energy” (2016).
51EIA, “Spot Prices for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products,” https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.
ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=M.
52See Hillard G. Huntington, “Measuring Oil Supply Disruptions: A Historical Perspective,” Energy Policy 115 (April
2018): 426–33, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.12.020.
53Author’s calculation based on BP, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy.”
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Geostrategic Location
Great powers also assess geostrategic location, the regional strategic land-
scape surrounding client oil states, in deciding the level of petro-alignment.
A region is “geostrategic” if a great power patron faces competition for
control and influence with the rival powers, and “non-geostrategic” when it
does not or cannot compete against rival powers. The geostrategic location
variable is accordingly coded by whether two or more great powers have
military power projection capabilities to a given oil state. According to this
definition, the Middle East or Europe during the Cold War or Central Asia
and the Caucasus post-Cold War were geostrategic locations whereby the
United States and the Soviet Union (and Russia) had overlapping military
power projection capabilities. In contrast, during the Cold War, South
America and most of Africa were non-geostrategic due to being largely
detached from the Soviet Union’s military power projection capability.
Location determines the vulnerability of client states’ oil to great power
rivalry. On the one hand, the overlapping military power projection capa-
bilities renders oil fields and states in geostrategic locations more vulner-
able to military competition and confrontation, territorial conquest, and
disruptions in oil-transportation routes by rival powers.54 This vulnerability
potentially jeopardizes a stable flow of oil to the patron great powers. Its
impact can be particularly critical during wartime, when competition for
oil is an intense zero-sum game. Military campaigns in Southeast Asia and
the Eastern Front in Europe during World War II, for instance, demon-
strated how the zero-sum game imposed by oil can drive the war strategies
of major powers and ultimately an outcome of the war.
Oil’s vital role historically justified a strategic rationale for great powers
to form a petro-alignment with the client producers in geostrategic loca-
tions. Petro-alignment aimed to enhance their defense and deterrence cap-
acity against rival powers’ threats and to forge an implicit or explicit
agreement that the client producers can supply oil to the patron during
wartime. At the same time, by building better defense capability, petro-
alignment effectively increases the cost for rival powers to gain control and
influence over the client oil producers, which then divert the rival powers’
limited military and political resources away from other potential points
of conflicts.
Not all oil states are sufficiently vulnerable to warrant petro-alignments.
Large producers such as Canada, Venezuela, Nigeria, or Indonesia were
valuable partners, but, thanks to their respective locations, rival powers
could not occupy their territory and deny their oil during wartime.
54For security of oil transportation issues and debates, see Hughes and Long, “Is There an Oil Weapon?”; Caitlin
Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” International Security 33, no. 1
(Summer 2008): 82–117, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.82.
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Competition for influence was correspondingly less, and therefore the need
for anticipatory petro-alignment less severe. And unlike in geostrategic
locations where local conflicts could quickly escalate into great power inter-
vention, as frequently seen in the Persian Gulf, in non-geostrategic loca-
tions domestic and regional conflicts and competition involving oil states
generally remained isolated and local. Military support was therefore largely
limited to internal and regional sources of threats.
Oil and Petro-Alignment Type
Great powers’ security patronages vary in credibility and commitment in
tandem with different levels of market power and geostrategic location.
However, the alliance literature has long used a dichotomous coding of alli-
ance commitment being either being “present” or “absent,” and has yet to
equip itself with a typology that captures more fine-grained distinctions
across petro-alignments. To address this gap, I propose three criteria—
material support, institutionalization, commitment—to differentiate the
subtler distinctions in security relationships. At a basic level, a petro-align-
ment involves some level of transfer of military support from great power
patron to client oil state, coded as material support. Examples of such
transfers include military aid, provision of training, preferential access to
arms, and, under extreme conditions, troops deployable in a rapid manner
in times of military contingencies. Institutionalization strengthens the tie
further by ensuring that material support occurs in a more sustained and
coherent manner rather than in an ad hoc, needs-based arrangement.55
Lastly, the robustness of petro-alignment is complete with the great power’s
commitment or an explicit statement to protect its client oil state(s) against
external threats.56
Table 2 shows an aggregate value of these criteria determines different
types of petro-alignment. In descending order of a great power’s
Table 2. Petro-alignment types and their attributes.
Petro-Alignment Type
Security guarantee Strategic alignment Strategic favor Neglect
Attributes
Material support Y Y Y N
Institutionalization Y Y N N
Commitment Y N N N
55Institutionalization also can make alliance more adaptable to new security environment. Celeste A. Wallander,
“Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (Autumn
2000): 705–35, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551343.
56I assume written statements do not necessarily carry more credibility than verbal ones. Some alliances are not
“written down” out of concerns such as triggering domestic political backlash.
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commitment to its oil-state client, the values are security guarantee, stra-
tegic alignment, strategic favor, and neglect.
At the top of the list is security guarantee, which largely conforms to the
traditional definition of alliance, whereby a great power pledges to protect
the sovereignty of its client oil state from outside aggression. Accordingly,
the relationship of a security guarantee carries a significant transfer of mili-
tary support, operates on institutionalized procedures, and most signifi-
cantly is founded upon an explicit commitment to protect the client state.
These properties are costly to maintain due to the financial expense, repu-
tational cost, and enhanced risk of entrapment. A security guarantee is
therefore offered only under exceptional circumstances, where security of
the client ally is vital to a patron’s own national security.
Next is strategic alignment. Here, a great power’s interest is to support
regime stability through institutionalized military cooperation but stops
short of an explicit commitment. In other words, automatic military inter-
vention to defend an oil state is neither guaranteed nor even expected.
Instead, repeated and substantive expressions of sustained and institutional-
ized military cooperation in forms of military aid, sales of advanced weap-
ons systems, or joint military exercises are requisites. Under strategic
alignment, an institutionalized form of military ties makes the relationship
relatively resilient against exogenous shocks but lacks a patron’s provision
of full protection.
The third petro-alignment type is strategic favor. Substantively, material
support is likely to be less frequent, less ambitious, and smaller in overall
scope than with strategic alignment. More importantly, military cooper-
ation occurs absent mutually agreed institutionalized procedures and
instead is ad hoc and needs based. No regularized meeting or institutional-
ized procedures exist for such cooperation.
Lastly, a great power can “neglect” an oil state to the point where mili-
tary cooperation is negligible, and the bilateral relationship is only diplo-
matic: material support, institutionalized procedures, and issuing a
commitment statement will not occur in the name of the great power’s
interest in oil.





Price-upsetter Strategic alignment Strategic favor
Price-follower Strategic favor Neglect
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Determining Petro-Alignment Types
The petro-alignment type available to oil states is determined by a combination
of market power and geostrategic location. First, a price-stabilizer obtains a
great power’s security guarantee regardless of its location. The price-stabilizing
role is the “energy equivalent of nuclear weapons,”57 making swing producers’
friendliness and stability absolutely vital for a great power’s energy security,
macroeconomic management, and its design and implementation of grand
strategies. Furthermore, spare production capacity is an asset bestowed only on
the largest producers: the history of oil is unambiguous about the highly sensi-
tive, instantaneous, and consequential movements of the global oil market to
the preferences, regime and state security, and behavior of its top producer(s).
The mix of excess capacity and large market share renders an uninterrupted
and friendly access to price-stabilizers’ oil vital for great powers’ own market
and military interests. Even market optimists acknowledge that a crisis in Saudi
Arabia, the contemporary price-stabilizer, would be a “nightmare.”58 Given the
price-stabilizer’s exceptional power and status in the market of an exceptionally
important commodity, I posit that a patron great power has both political and
economic rationales to guarantee the price-stabilizer’s stability and survival,
independent of its exposure to a rival great power’s influence.
Second, price-upsetters in geostrategic locations will secure great powers’
strategic alignment. These oil producers, such as Kuwait, Iran, or Iraq, each
carry a combination of partial market power conferred by their substantial
volume of oil production and partial strategic vulnerability to rival great
power’s control and influence. These producers have historically proven
capable of altering the oil market equilibrium, tying the stability of the oil
market to their regime and state security. Geostrategic location also bol-
stered their military values and created politicized competition for commer-
cial opportunities. The competitive pressures exerted toward Iran by the
Soviet Union and the United States in the late 1940s or Iraq in the late
1960s, for instance, were predicated upon concern for strategic ramifica-
tions and commercial access.59
However, price-upsetters are not indispensable to great powers’ macro-
economic or strategic preferences like price-stabilizers. Supply disruptions
originating from price-upsetters fall short of destructive and are increas-
ingly manageable within the market. Unlike price-stabilizers, the military
value of price-upsetters do not go beyond their respective regions. Large
commercial projects can occur for exploration, production, delivery, or
57Edward L. Morse and James Richard, “The Battle for Energy Dominance,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (March/April
2002): 20.
58Gholz and Press, “Protecting ‘The Prize,’” 483.
59Kristen Blake, The U.S.-Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945–1962: A Case in the Annals of the Cold War (Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 2009).
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refinery within price-upsetters, but they are intermittent and, with most of
the large oil fields already in operation, declining in number and size.
Overall, the necessity and desirability of keeping price-upsetters friendly
clearly necessitates some degree of institutionalized interaction to allow
constant and close monitoring and assistance to address their security con-
cerns. Yet its value is less than that of a price-stabilizer. A full security
umbrella is too pricey for a great power’s foreign security posture; hence
strategic alignment is a likely choice for a price-upsetter.
Third, strategic favor or an ad hoc strategic commitment will be the out-
come for price-upsetters located in non-geostrategic locations and price-fol-
lowers located in geostrategic locations. Their strategic value is more limited
than price-upsetters in geostrategic locations, as they lack either geostrategic
significance (Nigeria, Venezuela) or market power (Azerbaijan, Yemen).
Non-geostrategic upsetters lack military value and commercial challenges
since there is no competing rival power influence. This situation renders
sustained strategic commitment unnecessary, and minimally functional
needs-based strategic favors can serve a great power’s interest in securing
occasional commercial contracts. Price-followers in geostrategic locations,
on the other hand, have no influence in the market. Their worth is con-
structed upon potential military value and business openings that rational-
ize some security assistance. Overall, neither non-geostrategic price-
upsetters nor price-followers in geostrategic locations warrant sustained
and significant security assistance. Instead, the strategic commitment
emerges only when needs arise, such as intermittent conduct of joint exer-
cises and training, or the occasional sale of advanced weapon systems.
Fourth, those oil states that have neither market power nor geostrategic
value do not receive any oil-based military commitment from great powers.
Because their oil raises no strategic interests for great powers, their political
economies of oil are effectively decoupled from their alliance opportunities.
Although some non-geostrategic price-followers, such Australia or
Thailand, are military allies of the United States, their bilateral security ties
have little to do with oil; hence they do not qualify as petro-alignment.
Case Selection Strategy
To formulate a case selection strategy, I coded the market-power status and
geostrategic location of individual oil states in every year they produced oil
of any quantity during 1970–2013. Market power was coded based on the
British Petroleum (BP) dataset.60 For illustration purposes, I separately cre-
ated Table 4 based on the average market share of individual oil producers
60BP, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy.” Oil-producing major powers are excluded, which are the United
States, the USSR/Russia, Britain, and China.
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in 1970–2013 to show a broad distribution of market power across oil pro-
ducers.61 For price-stabilizers, Saudi Arabia was the only swing producer in
this period. There were eight price-upsetters who produced more than 2.5
percent of global production on average during the period, and the remain-
ing thirty-five producers were price-followers.
Geostrategic location was coded on an examination of qualitative evi-
dence. I consulted secondary sources to determine whether a region where
a given oil producer is located was exposed to competing spheres of influ-
ence or military power projection capabilities by great power(s). Generally
speaking, the Middle East during the Cold War, or Central Asia and
Caucasus post-Cold War, are coded as geostrategic, while Africa or Latin
America was out of the Soviet’s military reach, hence “non-geostrategic,” as
reflected in Table 4. I considered and substantiated great power military
presence and projection capability for each case study examined below.
In selecting cases to demonstrate the effects of market power and geo-
strategic locations on petro-alignment types, I chose oil states facing intense
rivalry in the region or a severe external security threat on a sustained
basis. Such a security environment necessitates an active search for an
external patron and full utilization of its strategic value in foreign security
policy. According to this selection criteria, two pairs of cases were identi-
fied. One is Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 1971–1991. While isolating other
confounding factors such as effects of changing oil-industry structure and
the effects of the end of the Cold War, the pair allows one to examine
whether and how differential market power, combined with the shared geo-
strategic setting, led to the distinct petro-alignments. The Saudi
Arabia–Kuwait comparison serves as a major case, as their rich histories of






Price-Upsetter Iran; Iraq; Kuwait; UAE Canada; Mexico; Venezuela; Nigeria
Price-Follower Azerbaijan; Kazakhstan;
Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan; Denmark;
Norway; Oman; Qatar; Syria; Yemen;
Argentina; Brazil; Colombia; Ecuador;
Peru; Trinidad and Tobago; Italy;
Romania; Algeria; Angola; Chad;
Congo; Egypt; Equatorial Guinea;
Gabon; Libya; Sudan; Tunisia;
Australia; Brunei; India; Indonesia;
Malaysia; Thailand; Vietnam
Bold denotes involve countries selected as case studies.
61While most oil producers did not change market-power status in the period, some producers moved between
categories, such as Norway and Libya, who produced above the 2.5 percent threshold in some years but
below the threshold on average (2.48 percent and 2.30 percent, respectively).
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security interaction with the United States are useful to test the theory of
petro-alignment. I follow this with a short plausibility probe on Azerbaijan
and Ecuador in 1991–2015—two price-followers producing comparable vol-
umes of oil but under different geostrategic settings. Azerbaijan is located
where the United States and Russia compete for spheres of influence while
facing stiff security competition from Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabahk
region. Ecuador is not exposed to great power rivalry but faces a long-stand-
ing territorial dispute with Peru, including a brief war in 1995. The
Azerbaijan–Ecuador dyad compares the effects of geostrategic location and
explores the applicability of petro-alignment theory beyond the Persian Gulf.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 1971–91
Geographically, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait sit at the center of the highly
strategized Persian Gulf, where the political economy of oil has constituted
an integral part of their national security strategies and environment. Given
their common location, their differential market powers ultimately
accounted for varying credibility and commitment of US patronage. Saudi
Arabia, a price-stabilizer, secured a security guarantee, whereas the United
States offered strategic alignment to Kuwait, a price-upsetter.
Geostrategic Location
The strategic environment for both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was defined
by the superpower rivalry during the Cold War. Their geographical prox-
imity to superpowers’ military bases, together with strategic significance of
the region, rationalized the development of great power military power
projection capability to the Persian Gulf. In the 1970s, the region under-
went a rapid acceleration of this superpower rivalry, initially prompted by
the British departure in 1971 and a series of following intra- and interstate
conflicts. On the one hand, US Persian Gulf strategy has always been
accompanied by military power projection capability, transitioning from a
symbolic presence of Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) with reliance on
its two local allies—Saudi Arabia and Iran in the 1970s—to a creation of a
more formalized and institutionalized Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
(RDJTF) and the US Central Command (CENTCOM) by the early 1980s.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was concerned with contributions
of Gulf oil to US military and industrial power, and embarked upon build-
ing its strategic presence there.62 By 1980, it allegedly had achieved the
62John A. Berry, “Oil and Soviet Policy in the Middle East,” Middle East Journal 26, no. 2 (Spring 1972): 149–60;
Aryeh Yodfat and Mordechai Abir, In the Direction of the Gulf: The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf (London:
Frank Cass, 1977).
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capability to project heavy and armored ground forces to the “waters of the
Arabian Sea” and the Kuwaiti oil fields within ten to twelve days.63
Deepening military ties with states such as Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen in the
1970s complemented the Soviets’ pursuit for a greater regional military
presence. Though more limited than the United States, the Soviet’s projec-
tion capability was sufficient to create competitive pressure in the region—
not all of the Persian Gulf had to be occupied to disrupt US interests.64
Contributions of Saudi and Kuwaiti Oil
The oil market in the 1970s had witnessed two crucial changes in the
Persian Gulf: the nationalization of oil companies across the region and
Iran’s concomitant push for hawkish oil pricing due to the Shah’s aggres-
sive search for prestige, autonomy, and influence. With the shock from the
1973 crisis barely gone, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait gained increasing import-
ance in Washington’s search for dovish and powerful oil suppliers.
Both were valuable producers since 1971, but their market powers sig-
nificantly differed both quantitatively and qualitatively. On the one hand,
Saudi Arabia’s production volume outnumbered other producers, rapidly
increasing from 3.9mb/d in 1970 to 10.3mb/d in 1981; a production cut
followed until the mid-1980s, which gradually recovered to 8.8mb/d by
1991. In the same period, the United States and the Soviet Union generally
produced more, pumping out around 9–11mb/d and 8–12mb/d, respect-
ively, but they needed additional barrels of oil for domestic and allies’ con-
sumption.65 Saudi Arabia also held the largest proven reserves, and its
relatively meager domestic consumption made it by far the largest oil
exporter in the world, accounting for up to 32.9 percent of daily oil trade.66
These attributes naturally made Riyadh emerge as a long-term source of
secure and stable oil supply.
Kuwait, on the other hand, produced around 2–3mb/d, approximately
3–6 percent of global production in the 1970s. In the 1980s Kuwait cut its
production volume following Saudi Arabia’s effort to control oil prices, and
thus technically failed to meet the 2.5 percent threshold. Its production vol-
ume, however, gradually recovered from the self-imposed cut in the late
1980s, eventually producing comfortably more than 2.5 percent of global
supply in the 1990s. Large reserves and the small domestic consumption
63Summary of Conclusion of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting, 14 January 1980, Foreign Relations of
the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1977–1980, vol. 18, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, doc. 40, https://
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d40.
64Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar,
Straus, & Giroux, 1983).
65BP, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy.”
66This was in 1981, when it exported 9.55mb/d out of 29.03mb/d of global oil trade. Author’s calculation based
on ibid.
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also made Kuwait a significant player in the oil trade, for which
Washington evaluated its power to be “extremely important in terms of oil
production and financial aspects.”67
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait aligned their oil production and pricing policy
largely with Washington’s preference for market stability. One venue was a
highly divided Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
where the two consistently played doves against price hawks. Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait preferred price moderation and stability over maximization of
short-term profits, as their high per capita income, small population, and
large proven reserves created more resilience in state finance and made
them prefer world’s long-run reliance on oil.68 On the other side, OPEC
had many hawkish members, notably Iran and Iraq, who repeatedly called
for cartelized action to shore up the oil price to quickly increase their rev-
enue at the expense of stability in the oil price and Western industrialized
economies. Against the backdrop of vivid memories of the 1973 oil-price
shock, Washington engaged in active diplomacy with the OPEC producers
to not repeat the economic downturn out of volatile oil price’s movement.
To Washington’s disappointment, however, its long-time ally Tehran did
not drop its demand for oil price increases; it was Riyadh who agreed to
exercise its market power to resist, moderate, or even reverse the hawk-
ish pressure.69
One of the earliest such efforts occurred in December 1976, when Saudi
Arabia initially managed to procure a moderate price increase of 5 percent
rather than the 10 percent demanded by other OPEC members in 1977,
freeze prices later in the year, and pump out at a higher volume in 1978 to
lower the oil price.70 Kuwait also remained generally dovish by playing a
moderate within OPEC.71 Overall, Kuwait, along with Saudi Arabia, had
“consistently indicated their recognition of a strong mutual economic inter-
est with the major industrial nations,” as testified by Assistant Secretary of
State Joe Siseo on the alignment of the two producers’ policy and
Washington’s push for market stability.72
In addition to the price-stabilization efforts, the two producers have also
proven valuable in US military strategy. One lesser known consequence of
the 1973 oil embargo was its deleterious effect on meeting daily oil
67Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, 13 October 1977, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. 8, Arab-Israeli Dispute,
doc. 130. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d130.
68Lisa Blaydes, “Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC,” International
Organization 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 221, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582012.
69Andrew Scott Cooper, The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the
Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012).
70William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, 1981) 129; Cooper, The Oil Kings, 353–87.
71Francisco Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013), 235
72Quoted in F. Gregory Gause, “British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1973,” Review of
International Studies 11, no. 4 (October 1985): 265.
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requirements for US military postures around the globe, including the
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.73 In November, for instance, the
Pentagon advised the White House that the “DoD [Department of
Defense] petroleum shortage is very serious … we will soon be forced to
begin standing down operational forces.”74 Upon receiving the US request
for fuel, Saudi king Faisal, fearing further deterioration of diplomatic rela-
tions with Washington, agreed to ship a variety of fuels to US warships
and bases. Not only did Riyadh bear the financial costs to provide military
fuels, it also risked domestic and regional political backlash. In the First
Gulf War, Saudi Arabia similarly offered fuel to coalition forces free of
charge. Kuwait, on the other hand, provided free fuel for MIDEASTFOR
ships escorting reflagged tankers during the Stark incident in 1987,75
though their more limited oil volume meant that Kuwait’s contribution was
usually less notable. No direct confrontation between the superpowers
leaves no actual cases of Gulf oil fueling the larger and more critical con-
flicts. Their oil was perceived to be “crucial to the war capability of the
NATO alliance,” however, and the safety of its production and flow was at
the heart of the top-level decision making.76
Saudi Arabia as the Swing Producer
While Saudi Arabia’s market power was partly built upon its unrivalled size
in production, reserves, and export, what truly set it apart from the rest of
producers was its possession of excess capacity.77 Saudi Arabia emerged as
a new dominant swing producer in the early 1970s when rising domestic
demand forced the TRC to deplete its spare capacity. The National
Intelligence Estimate recognized the new reality and what it meant in the
market—only the Gulf’s oil, a majority of which was in Saudi Arabia, could
compensate for any future supply interruptions.78
The extent to which the use of excess capacity stabilized the market is
hard to quantify due to the data-availability issue and other confounding
73Cooper, The Oil Kings; Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 119–20.
74“Memorandum for Brigadier General Richard Lawson, USAF, Military Assistant to the President, 30 November
1973” Folder: “Energy Crisis, November 1973–74,” Box 321, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project,
National Archives II, quoted in Bronson, Thicker than Oil, 119.
75Frank C. Carlucci, “Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the Congress,” 1990, https://history.defense.gov/
Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1990a_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-151621-343.
76Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review, Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM)
/NSC-10, 18 February 1977, https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/memorandums/prm10.pdf.
77Other Gulf producers such as Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have historically possessed some spare
capacities, but their volumes are too meager to be meaningful. For instance, Kuwait and the UAE were
reported to have only 0.02mb/d and 0.06mb/d as spare capacity in 2015. IEA, “Oil Market Report,” 13 March
2015, 17.
78National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 30-1-71, 1 April 1971, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 24, Middle East Region and
Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, doc. 96. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
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factors that could have affected price movements. Studies strongly suggest,
however, that Riyadh functioned as a critical buffer. By the end of 1970s,
for instance, Washington’s top leadership came to a conclusion that the
survival of the global oil market against supply shocks critically hinged on
the Saudi Arabia’s use of excess capacity.79 A systematic Energy
Information Administration study found that in both supply disruptions in
1978 Iran and at the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in 1980, which respect-
ively removed 5mb/d and 3mb/d, the market successfully minimized the
supply disruptions by drawing extra oil out of the ground.80 The largest
intervention occurred in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
which immediately took 4.4mb/d off the market. In a similar fashion,
Riyadh responded by quickly adding 2.8mb/d to global supply, minimizing
and shortening the price shock.81 The market-stabilization benefits made
the excess capacity “the signal characteristic of Saudi [oil] policy, [serving
as] the centerpiece of US-Saudi relationship.”82
The spare production capacity was also what enabled Riyadh to prevail
over OPEC hawks. No cartelized action by OPEC could succeed without
the Riyadh’s blessing, as its pumping out additional barrels of oil could
effectively neutralize the agreed production cut. That was precisely the
mechanism—a production increase from 8.5mb/d in December 1976 to
9.7mb/d in February 1977—with which Saudi Arabia thwarted the Shah’s
vigorous push for the price increase in 1976–77.83 As the outgoing Henry
Kissinger observed in 1977, “Only they [the Saudis] can raise production to
make it [OPEC’s price moderation] stick.”84
While Saudi Arabia’s self-interest to maintain market stability and aid
the recovery of the Western economies drove these behaviors, the dovish
intervention was neither cost free nor assured. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s lone
push for price moderation occasionally caused political tension with its
Arab neighbors who wanted a higher oil price for oil revenue increases and
as leverage against the West’s pro-Israeli policies. Amidst Iran’s production
fall in 1978–80, for instance, Saudi Arabia went against its own professed
commitment to price moderation by refusing to release its excess capacity,
allegedly due to the troubled US-Saudi relations over the fall of the Shah
and the highly contentious Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.85 In response, the
United States had to undertake a major diplomatic effort to convince
79Memorandum from Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to President Carter, 4 January 1979, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol.
37, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, doc. 181, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37/d181.
80Quoted in Gholz and Press, “Protecting ‘The Prize,’” 471–72.
81IMF, “Saudi Arabia.”
82Morse and Richard, “The Battle for Energy Dominance,” 19–20.
83Cooper, The Oil Kings, 360–70.
84Henry Kissinger in 1977, quoted in Cooper, The Oil Kings, 364.
85Parra, Oil Politics, 224–27; Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1988), 298–303; 401–3.
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Saudis to offset the Iranian shortfall and stabilize the price.86 Washington sim-
ply could not rely on the Saudis’ goodwill in ensuring market stability. Nor
did Saudi Arabia intend to let the West enjoy the benefits for free. Instead,
the price-moderating intervention was dubbed as “a present,” or “Christmas
box” that Washington was expected to value and reciprocate.87 “We expect
the West, especially the United States, to appreciate what we did,” reminded
Ahmed Zaki Yamani, an influential oil minister of Saudi Arabia.88
The US Security Guarantee to Saudi Arabia
In evaluating and determining the level of security commitment to the
House of Saud, Washington consistently made references to its rare mix of
exceptional value and vulnerability. As Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberg
once justified needs for increased military support to Saudi Arabia, its oil
resources were “vast and irreplaceable [and] … vulnerable and threat-
ened.” 89 In terms of vulnerability, Washington was growingly agitated
about Soviet military forces in the 1970s, which was believed to be capable
of “swiftly occupy[ing] and declar[ing] fait accompli in certain areas of the
[Gulf] region.90 According to President Carter’s National Security Council
(NSC)’s assessment, such a scenario could potentially “undermine the via-
bility of NATO and Japan and cause enormous economic disruptions in
Europe, Japan, and the United States.”91 Waltz went as far as arguing that
the Soviet’s control of Persian oil would be “comparable to its seizing terri-
tories in Western Europe or Japan.”92 Washington consequently began ser-
ious discussions about shifting priorities toward the Persian Gulf at the
expense of its preexisting commitment to Europe and northeast Asia in the
late 1970s in order to stem such possibility.93
And within the vulnerable Persian Gulf, it did not require complex and
long calculation for Washington to conclude that “US long-term interests
were greatest in Saudi Arabia.”94 Simply put, no producers could rival the
86Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, 130–33.
87Shahram Chubin, Security in the Persian Gulf: The Role of Outside Powers (Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun, 1982),
73; Cooper, The Oil Kings, 357.
88Cooper, The Oil Kings, 361.
89Caspar Weinberger, “Remarks for the Secretary of Defense before the United States Senate Armed Service
Committee on the Air Defense Enhancement Package for Saudi Arabia,” Department of Defense, 28
September 1981.
90See Abraham S. Becker and Arnold L. Horelick, Soviet Policy in the Middle East (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970),
61; Francis Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and Iraq since 1968 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1980).
91From Presidential Directive 62, as quoted in Olav Njølstad, “Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US Strategic
Planning in the Carter Years,” Cold War History 4, no. 3 (April 2004): 45, https://doi.org/10.1080/
1468274042000231141.
92Waltz, “A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force,” 62.
93For archival evidence for the change, Njølstad, “Shifting Priorities.”
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scale, speed, and range of benefits the largest exporter and a dominant
swing producer offered to the patron. Such unique oil power revived a
view that “security of Saudi Arabia [was] … of vital interest to the US,”
for which Washington’s security assistance and assurance to Saudi Arabia
was rationalized “as a concomitant of that interest,”95 and sometimes more
specifically, as to “convince the Saudis that Washington appreciated their
[favorable] oil pricing and production.”96An increase in material support in
both quantity and quality, institutionalization of military cooperation, and
public and private assurances of US commitment to Saudi Arabia’s territor-
ial sovereignty followed, fortifying the bilateral security ties that, summed
up, made a security guarantee.
First, the United States expanded its material support to enhance the
Saudi defense capability from a meager $305 million in 1972 to $5 billion
in 1975.97 Not only did the volume increase but also Saudi Arabia was
granted access to the most sophisticated weaponry. As a US policymaker
then observed, “I do not know of anything that is nonnuclear that we
would not give the Saudis.”98 Indeed, in May 1978, US Congress approved
Saudi Arabia as one of only three countries granted the entirety of its ori-
ginal arms request, the others being Israel and Egypt.99
Material support was frequently justified in terms of the Saudis’ practice
and promise of price-stabilizing power. For instance, the US Government
Accounting Office defended selling military hardware and services as expli-
citly due to the Saudis’ “ability to vary production within a wide range and
thereby be a decisive factor in the amount and price of oil available for the
world market.”100 In the late 1970s, Saudi-American relations began to be
redefined by an exchange of market stabilization and security commitment.
In trying to cope with a supply disruption because of the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, the Policy Review Committee agreed to consider mak-
ing “progress … in security issues … before the US could weigh in ser-
iously with the Saudis on increasing their long-term production
capacity.”101 In July 1979, Saudi Arabia increased its oil production from
8.5mb/d to 9.5mb/d, to which the US government responded with approv-
ing the sale of $1.2 billion of military equipment to the Saudi National
95Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, 5 June 1979, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol.
18, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, doc. 193, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-
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Guard.102 In similar quid pro quo fashion, at the onset of Iraq–Iran War in
1980, Saudi Arabia agreed to raise its production from 9.7mb/d to
10.3mb/d to stem panic and stabilize the market, but also as a specific
return for US deployment of an Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) with supporting equipment and personnel.103 The security sup-
port and patronage represented Washington’s key leverage in the petro-
alignment arrangement. The transfer of large volumes of high-technology
weapons systems continued into the 1980s, albeit with occasional moments
of tension, under a pro-American King Fahd, who assumed the throne in
1982, and President Ronald Reagan, who, despite fierce opposition from
the Senate and Israel, spent a significant amount of his political capital on
the sale of state-of-art AWACS and F-15s to the Saudis.104
Furthermore, because Saudi excess capacity was a constantly sought after
and structural asset to the market and US military, material support corres-
pondingly occurred in a sustained and institutionalized format, not on an
ad hoc basis. Historically, the 1970s witnessed a proliferation of such initia-
tives, including the creation of the Joint Security Cooperation Commission
and the Office of Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard aimed
to advance US-Saudi military ties and arms sales, and to strengthen the
regime security against internal dangers, respectively.105 Similar earlier ini-
tiatives like the US Military Training Mission, set up in the 1950s, contin-
ued and expanded as well. The pinnacle was the creation of CENTCOM
after the Carter Doctrine in 1980. While aimed to upgrade and institution-
alize US deployability with broadly defined regional coverage, it was an
open secret that Saudi Arabia sat at the center of CENTCOM.106 In all, the
creation and proliferation of institutionalized formats for military cooper-
ation were not only instrumental in reorganizing, developing, and upgrad-
ing the Saudi military but also ensured that “US military assistance
programs [were] … lineal descendants of the recommendations and pro-
posal embodied in the plan and not simply politically inspired US
responses to ad hoc Saudi arms requests.”107
Finally, Washington has repeatedly assured Saudi Arabia of its full com-
mitment to protect its security since the 1970s.108 The United States’ first
such statement dates to a meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt
102Safran, Saudi Arabia, 404.
103Keefer, Harold Brown, 281; Safran, Saudi Arabia, 410.
104Bronson, Thicker than Oil, 154–63.
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Arabia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2005), 287.
106Bronson, Thicker than Oil, 162.
107David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 44.
Also see Keith Crane et al., Imported Oil and U.S. National Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 60–62.
108This is not to say that the US commitment was consistent and equally robust. At the height of the 1973 oil
crisis, for instance, the United States contemplated a use of force to occupy oil fields in Saudi Arabia.
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and King Abdel Aziz al Saud on the USS Quincy in 1945. However, after a
quick succession of crises in 1979—the Iranian Revolution in January, the
siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November, and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in December—exposed Riyadh’s heightened vulnerability,
Washington began to make its commitment more explicit and substantial.
In March 1979, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance publicly declared that the
United States would use force to defend vital Saudi oil fields.109 Soon after
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan exacerbated the strategic rivalry over
Gulf oil, a higher-level and more-formal statement of the US commitment
followed in what later became known as the Carter Doctrine. Riyadh was
assured of Washington’s commitment to use “any means necessary, includ-
ing military force,” by which Vance’s statement on the defense of “vital
Saudi oil fields” was made “more explicit.”110 Reagan expanded the scope
of the assurance to internal threats, stating that “the US will not allow
Saudi Arabia to fall into the hands of any internal or external forces threat-
ening to cut off oil supplies to the West … the bulk of the energy needed
to turn the wheels of industry in the Western world … there’s no way
that we could stand by and see that taken over by anyone that would shut
off that oil.”111
While the US security guarantee was visible and credible, caution is in
order about the role Riyadh’s oil played in the evolution of US-Saudi secur-
ity relations. First, Saudi price-stabilizing power was significant but not
absolute. In fact, Riyadh was not the only actor that helped market stability;
oil-importing states’ strategic petroleum reserves or use of private invento-
ries were also available to restore the supply-demand equilibrium.112
Second, oil was not the only reason Riyadh was valuable to Washington.
Saudi Arabia’s anticommunism, religious influence, and regional leadership
all formed central parts of Washington–Riyadh ties.113 Third, the bilateral
relationship had been far from harmonious, constantly facing moments of
tensions and conflicts, most notably over the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.
However, the historical record consistently shows that oil was the Saudis’
key leverage in extracting security patronage from the United States. As
Kissinger once uttered, “We wouldn’t give a damn about Saudi Arabia if it
didn’t have most of the oil in the region.”114 Saudi oil was uniquely power-
ful. No other producers could rival Saudi Arabia’s production and export
109Naif bin Hethlain, Saudi Arabia and the US since 1962: Allies in Conflict (London: SAQI, 2010), 119.
110Yergin, The Prize, 684; For more subtle and detailed review of the Carter administration’s Middle East policy,
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volume, or replicate its ability to stabilize the market in times of unantici-
pated supply shocks with the comparable effectiveness, making it “vital to
U.S. interests and really to the interests of the Western world.”115 For the
protection of this vital and vulnerable interest, the United States accepted
the costs and risks involved in providing a security guarantee.
Strategic Alignment for Kuwait
As a price-upsetter, Kuwait’s security, stability, and friendliness were sig-
nificantly relevant to global oil price movement and US military planning.
Unlike the global dependence on Saudi Arabia, however, the world market
was simply not beholden to the orientation, decisions, or exogenous devel-
opment of oil production in Kuwait. Consequently, the United States was
content with providing strategic alignment, or assisting with arming under
a moderately institutionalized agreement, but explicitly without commit-
ment to the security of Kuwait.
Institutional format for US assistance dates to 1972, when, at the request
of the Kuwaiti government, the United States proposed the creation of the
Military Assistance Advisory Group to facilitate the deployment of military
advisors and enroll Kuwait in its Foreign Military Sales program. Kuwait
ultimately agreed to establish a permanent US Liaison Office in Kuwait in
1975, supervising weapons transfers and training of Kuwaiti armed forces
in an institutionalized manner.116 Arms sales soon followed and continued,
including $500–$600 million of cutting-edge military equipment in the
1970s and the training of 3,000 Kuwaiti military personnel at the Pentagon
in the 1980s.117 By the mid-1980s, a $1.9 billion arms package deal was
also agreed upon.
The scope of US military support to Kuwait was largely limited to
enhancing Kuwait’s military prowess through arms transfers and train-
ing.118 What distinguished the two client oil states was the absence of an
explicit US security guarantee. Unlike Saudi Arabia, in almost all crises
involving Kuwait, the United States remained categorical in its refusal to
state a commitment to protect Kuwait’s sovereignty. Over the border dis-
pute with Iraq throughout the 1970s, the United States refused to take a
stand when asked, or simply paid little attention to the security situa-
tions.119 In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the United
States again refused to commit to addressing the spread of revolution and
115George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 330.
116Panaspornprasit, US-Kuwaiti Relations, 1961–1992, 55.
117Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 82.
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its delegitimating impact on Kuwait’s politics and society in a US House of
Representatives hearing.120
There were two crises where Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were under the
same exogenous security threats, allowing rare analytical windows of
opportunity to compare US security responses across the two oil producers.
First, at the onset of the Tanker War, when both asked for Stinger missiles
to use against Iranian missile attacks, only Saudi Arabia was immediately
granted permission to purchase them; the Congress blocked the sale to
Kuwait. Kuwait also secured the reflagging operation only after
Washington’s learning that Kuwait was seeking Soviet assistance.121 The US
responses were lukewarm and passive at best, leading Kuwait to feel that
“the US [was] less interested in defending them than in controlling both
them and their oil.”122
The second test came with the First Gulf War. In some respects, Desert
Storm contradicted the expectation of petro-alignment, as the United States
ultimately committed its military to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, a
price-upsetter. However, a closer look strongly suggests that Kuwait’s secur-
ity was not necessarily seen as a US vital interest that warranted military
intervention. Less than two weeks before the invasion, April Glaspie, the
American ambassador to Iraq, made an infamous statement during her
meeting with Saddam Hussein: “We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab
conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait,” which some accused
of unintentionally giving a greenlight to the invasion.123 Only three days
before the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, John Kelly, the US assistant secretary
of state for Near East and South Asian affairs, also openly remarked that
the United States had no commitment obliging it to send forces should
Kuwait be overrun.124
In fact, the security of Saudi Arabia dominated White House thinking
once the Iraqi invasion began in August 1990. “Our first objective is to
keep Saddam out of Saudi Arabia, our second is to protect the Saudis
against retaliation when we shut down Iraq’s export capability,” remarked
President George H. W. Bush during a NSC meeting on 4 August 1990.125
Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was more explicit:
“I don’t see us going to war over Kuwait. Saudi Arabia, yes, if we had to;
but not Kuwait.”126 Reflecting the atmosphere, Operation Desert Shield was
authorized only five days after Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in August 1990
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as a preemptive and unmistakable statement of security guarantee to
Saudi Arabia.
Kuwait was simply no Saudi Arabia, which could and did “sweat” the
rest of OPEC in 1980s.127 And many in the military and the White House
were skeptical of committing military forces. General Gary E. Luck, com-
mander of the Joint Special Operations Command, confided to
Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz that he did not believe Kuwait
was worth the lives of US servicemembers.128 James A. Baker III, then sec-
retary of state, also recalled, “If the president had said prior to August 1990
that we were willing to go to war to protect Kuwait, many members of
Congress would have muttering impeachment.”129 The ambivalence about
the use of force was widespread. As Baker continued to recount, “Even
after Saddam had invaded Kuwait, there was little, if any, domestic support
for using our military … we had to build that support painstakingly.”130
In short, the skepticism suggests that Kuwait’s oil alone was not a sufficient
cause for US intervention. Other factors such as the disintegration of the
Soviet Union were relevant, but the most decisive factor that prompted the
military intervention appears to be the prospect of Iraq advancing toward
Saudi Arabia, a lynchpin in US Persian Gulf strategy.
Azerbaijan and Ecuador, 1990–2015
This section conducts a short cross-case plausibility probe on Azerbaijan
and Ecuador, two price-followers that carry opposite geostrategic signifi-
cance. As one of the most important “geopolitical pivots of Eurasia,”131
Azerbaijan secured strategic favor from increasingly interested great
powers. Ecuador, in contrast, carried little strategic value, and their meager
oil production alone could do little to entice US military interests, hence
the neglect.
Market Power and Geostrategic Location
As Figure 2 illustrates, both Azerbaijan and Ecuador produced far below
the 2.5 percent threshold of global daily supply, putting them in the cat-
egory of price-follower in the post–Cold War period. Azerbaijan produces
around 0.8–1.0mb/d, thanks to discoveries of new oil fields, upgrades in
127Ibid., 298.
128Jonathan Monten and Andrew Bennett, “Models of Crisis Decision Making and the 1990–91 Gulf War,”
Security Studies 19, no. 3 (July–September 2010): 504, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2010.505129.
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extraction technology, and constructions of new pipelines. Ecuador pro-
duced at consistent levels of 0.50–0.55mb/d throughout the 2000s.
The two countries’ geostrategic locations are anything but similar, how-
ever. Azerbaijan sits at the intersection of intense rivalry, mired in Russia’s
struggle to protect its “near abroad” against US suspicion of Russia’s inten-
tions. The rivalry translated into competing military power projection capa-
bilities. Since the 2000s, Russia stationed a significant military force in
South Caucasus, most notably its navy in the Caspian Sea.133 The United
States’ exceptional power projection capability in the region has been
increasingly evident, as initially observed in the Balkans during the late
1990s, which then strengthened with the post–September 11 deployments
to Khanabad in Uzbekistan, Manas in Kyrgyzstan, and Dushande in
Tajikistan.134
Ecuador, on the other hand, was never subject to a competing sphere of
influence. Latin America’s strategic significance hardly changed from the
Cold War, when the region was deemed “peripheral of Soviet security con-
cerns,” and simply out of the Moscow’s military reach.135 China, despite its
increasing economic presence today, is far from committed to acquiring
military power projection to the region. The United States, by virtue of
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Figure 2. Oil production share of Azerbaijan and Ecuador (%), 1990–2015.132
132Author’s calculation based on BP, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy.”
133Ilan Berman, “The New Battleground: Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1
(December 2004): 59–69, https://doi.org/10.1162/016366004251813; Jim Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Center, 2 April 2014).
134“Q&A: U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia,” New York Times, 26 July 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/
international/slot2_072605.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
135Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Policies and Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean: Special
National Intelligence Estimate” 25 June 1982, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/19820625.pdf.
32 I. KIM
influence but, absent a competing rival, Ecuador has yet to bear strategic
weight in US grand strategy.
US Strategic Favor to Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan held some strategic significance derived from its location in the
post–Cold War context. The location itself, however, was insufficient to
distinguish it from other neighboring states, noticeably its long-time foe,
Armenia. In fact, at the time of Azerbaijan’s independence, Armenia was
better connected to great powers. Moscow was more disposed to Yerevan
due to a shared historical and religious identity. Yerevan also had support
from powerful lobbying groups in Washington that allegedly succeeded in
the inclusion of Section 907 in its US Freedom Support Act, making
Azerbaijan the only post-Soviet country deprived of US government aid.136
Internationally isolated, Azerbaijan was eventually defeated by the
Armenia-supported Karabahk Army in the winter of 1992–93.
The great powers’ attitude dramatically changed, however, when Heydar
Aliyev seized power in Baku in October 1993 and undertook commercial-
ization and modernization of its long-expended and obsolete oil industry
by inviting international oil companies to develop the Caspian Sea. Great
powers began to eagerly approach Azerbaijan to secure E&P opportunities,
which were partly driven by lucrative nature of the contracts, but also
because who acquires the E&P rights entailed strategic significance. For the
United States, Azerbaijan’s oil, given its location, could partially relieve
Europe of its overreliance on Russian oil and gas. For Russia, it was not
only about commercial contracts; protecting its traditional sphere of influ-
ence and denying the Western influence was equally, if not
more, important.
Sensing the strategic opportunity, Aliyev carefully designed oil policy to
maximize the security benefits from the interested great powers. First, he
pushed for an inclusive and diversified award of the Caspian Sea oil E&P
contracts, clearly designed to secure political support from the host coun-
tries of the contracted oil companies.137 Many were American “because …
that would bring the American government into the equation by orienting
towards Europe and against Russia.”138 Aliyev was also careful not to jeop-
ardize the Russians, another key player in Azerbaijan’s national security, by
transferring 10 percent of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic
136Inessa Baban and Zaur Shiriyev, “The U.S. South Caucasus Strategy and Azerbaijan,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 9,
no. 2 (2010): 93–103.
137Pinar Ipek, “Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy and Challenges for Energy Security,” Middle East Journal 63, no. 2
(Spring 2009): 227–39; Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer, “The Foreign Policies of Post-Soviet Landlocked
States,” Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 3 (July 2011): 241–68, https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586X.27.3.241.
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(SOCAR)’s share in the highly-promising Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli fields
to Lukoil, a Russian company. Second, Aliyev opted for “state-ownership
without control,”139 an unusual practice for oil-rich authoritarian regimes
who prefer firm control over rent flow, opacity of their finances, and power
in personnel appointments. And yet, by creating an investment-friendly
environment, this arrangement was what made Azeri oil industries more
attractive for the international oil companies.140 Third, the highly contro-
versial pipeline routes accommodated competing preferences for the deliv-
ery of Azeri oil, which, as a landlocked country, could not reach major
markets by itself. Committed to “offend no one” and a multidimensional
foreign policy, Aliyev agreed to use a pipeline running north on the exist-
ing Russian pipeline system; a more controversial decision to build a pipe-
line linking Baku to Ceyhan was backed by US interests hoping to diversify
the import source away from Russian oil and gas.141
In response to Azerbaijan’s delivery of promise and benefits in oil secur-
ity, the initial US neglect of Azerbaijan began to change. Oil was a key
driver. President Bill Clinton pledged to “help Azerbaijan to prosper,”
thereby “diversifying [US] energy supply and the nation’s security,”142 dur-
ing Aliyev’s visit to the White House in 1997. The pledge was quickly
translated into military support. Figure 3 shows Azerbaijan gradually over-
taking Armenia in terms of US military assistance from 1990 to 2010.
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Figure 3. US Assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan, 1992–2010 (million USD).143
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Lukoil’s participation in the so-called Contract of the Century, Russia
promptly reciprocated by sending large quantities of arms, including tanks
and helicopters and more than 200 military advisors.
However, Russian and US security assistance amounted to no more than
an ad hoc provision of arms, lacking any institutionalized format. For
Moscow, the modest military interaction was never followed by any sub-
stantive shift in Russia’s posture toward the region, defined by its general
affinity toward Armenia. In Washington, Section 907 continued to face
annual battles in the Congress to secure exemptions. The partial neutraliza-
tion of a preexisting disadvantage hardly qualifies as institutionalization. It
is true that the two states enjoyed the added military support and institu-
tionalized cooperation over the Northern Distribution Network in the
2000s, but they were a consequence of the “War on Terror” and not of US
pursuit to secure Baku oil’s strategic significance.
Neglect to Ecuador
Ecuador’s military cooperation with the United States existed—it was a
recipient of substantial US military aid ($60 million in the 2000s) and a
host of US military bases (lease period of 1999–2009).144 Admittedly, the
US foreign policy establishment sometimes refers to oil as its foreign policy
interest with Ecuador. However, a closer examination of the bilateral rela-
tions reveals that oil plays almost no substantive role, and instead military
relations focus exclusively on other non-oil issues, most notably human
trafficking and counternarcotics operations. The Ecuadorian oil industry
simply has little substance to offer. Its non-geostrategic location bars its oil
from being strategically valuable for great powers’ grand strategies. Its triv-
ial market power similarly draws little market attention. Commercial
opportunities in oil industry are also hard to secure because, unlike
Azerbaijan, most of Ecuador’s oil industrial activities are controlled by its
national oil companies.145
On the other hand, China has been reported to have been emerging as a
major trading partner and foreign investor in various economic industries,
with oil and mining being the major ones.146 However, the relations are
largely defined by commercial and economic cooperation, with little evi-
dence of them translating into security-for-oil relations.147 In a hypothetical
144Clare Ribando Seelke, “Ecuador: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations.” CRS Report for Congress
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Center, 21 May 2008), 5–6.
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situation that China acquires projection capabilities to Latin America, a
more intense petro-alignment dynamic may emerge, but such a scenario
remains highly unlikely at this point.148 Overall, unlike Azerbaijan, as a
price-follower located in non-geostrategic Lain America, Ecuador and its
oil effectively sit outside any substantive security interests of great powers.
Petro-Alignments and International Security
One consensus in the oil literature is that oil’s effects are rarely absolute
and instead are conditional.149 Petro-alignment is no exception. Political
compatibility between members of petro-alignment, for instance, could
overturn the existing arrangement, as shown by how the 1979 overthrow of
the Shah abruptly put an end to US-Iran petro-alignment relations. Petro-
alignment is also nested under the larger strategic context; NATO member-
ship defines Norway’s military ties with the United States, not its oil
reserves. Security guarantees were extended to non-price-stabilizers such as
Iran under the Shah, as Iran offered additional strategic values acting as a
militarily strong and politically stable partner in the Gulf, or Kuwait after
the First Gulf War, which offered additional autonomy concessions by
allowing access to US Navy ships, the storage of military equipment, and
joint training and exercises.
However, oil’s strategic indispensability means that no analysis about
petro-alignment would hold without recognizing the individual oil states’
ability to stabilize or disrupt global oil supply and their contributions to
great power grand strategies. In making sense of the role of oil in forging
petro-alignment, this paper shows that volume and location of oil produc-
tion is fundamental in a great power’s setting of an appropriate level of
security commitment and oil states’ making an alliance opportunity out of
this crucial security asset.
This paper also contributes to larger theoretical debates. In coding petro-
alignment, it offers new ways of differentiating the depth and nature of
interstate security cooperative relations according to three criteria—material
support, institutionalization, commitment. This continues the recent effort
to move beyond the dichotomous coding prevailing in the alliance litera-
ture, and there is no a priori ground to rule out the generalizability of the
criteria and classifications presented here.
More broadly, by being specifically situated at an intersection between
oil-trade political economy and national security strategies, petro-alignment
148Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First
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shows how flawed and untenable an entrenched divide between political
economy and security studies is.150 Great powers take macroeconomic sta-
bility at both domestic and global levels as key criteria in formulating their
military posture and level of commitment across the globe. For others,
some commodities of strategic value are potential security assets that open
new external balancing opportunities. Overall, more efforts are needed to
re-bridge these two deeply divided, but ultimately inseparable, fields.
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